Showing posts with label signal. Show all posts
Showing posts with label signal. Show all posts

Thursday, February 25, 2010

INFORMATION PROCESSING - Cognitive Biases

HUMAN INFORMATION PROCESSING – A SOFT SYSTEM



Cognition and Information



By



VIKRAM KARVE





Part I – Cognitive Biases




The term cognition refers to a faculty for the processing of information. It is the process of perceiving, thinking, reasoning, analyzing and remembering.
 Information is value or quality of a message or communication between a sender and a receiver.

Data is observation of facts and information is a collection of data from which conclusions may be drawn, decisions taken and knowledge acquired.

Understanding Human Behaviour is sine qua non for the successful design and implementation of Soft Systems [Human Activity Systems], Management Information Systems and, indeed, all Information Processing Systems.



Human behaviour plays an important role in human information processing. It must be remembered that Information Systems are not installed in a vacuum; they are implanted into a living body, an organisation, a Human Activity Systems.

Human beings are being continuously exposed to an enormous number of stimuli. Cognition of all the stimuli is not possible and most stimuli are eliminated by a complex cognitive process. Even those stimuli which are perceived may be subject to cognitive biases.



A better understanding of human information processing enhances the usefulness of information technology and systems.



COGNITIVE BIASES



Here are a few salient cognitive biases which affect information formulation, acquisition, analysis and interpretation:



Adjustment and Anchoring – In situations of information overload there is a tendency to resort to the anchoring and adjustment heuristic and to rely too heavily, or “anchor” on a past reference or on one trait or piece of information when making decisions. For example, you may emphasize too much on the first piece of information you encounter.


Selective Perception – You accept / absorb only that information that is in consonance with, or confirms, your views, beliefs and values.



Wishful Thinking – You interpret information according to what might be pleasing to imagine [as you would like things to be] rather than according to actual evidence or rational logical reality.



Self-fulfilling Prophecy – is the tendency to engage in behaviors that elicit results which will (consciously or not) confirm our beliefs. You seek, acquire and analyze only that information that confirms or lends credibility to your views and values and ignore any information that contradicts your views or values. This is a “Confirmation bias” exemplified by an irrational tendency to search for, interpret or remember information in a way that confirms your preconceptions.


Ease of Recall – Information which can easily be recalled or accessed affects your perception of the likelihood of similar events occurring again. You rely too much on information that is easy to recall from memory.



Conservation – You reach premature conclusions on the basis of too small a sample of information.

Order Effects – The order in which information is presented to you affects information retention in your memory. Typically, the first piece of information presented [primacy effect] and the last piece of information presented [recency effect] assume undue importance in your mind.

Overconfidence – The greater the amount of data the more confident you are about the accuracy of the data.



Availability – you only rely on and use easily available information and ignore significant information that may not be so easily sourced.



Bandwagon Effect – you develop a tendency to believe information because many other people believe the same information. This may be a manifestation of Groupthink and you tend to “jump on the bandwagon”.



Hindsight – you are unable to think objectively if you receive information that a certain outcome has occurred and then told to ignore this information. With hindsight, outcomes that have occurred seem to have been inevitable; sometimes this is called the “I-knew-it-all-along” effect, the inclination to see past events as being predictable. You see relationships more easily in hindsight than in foresight.



Habit – You choose some information because it was previously accepted for a perceived similar purpose [precedence syndrome] or because of superstition.


Illusion of Control – You develop a tendency for to believe you can control or at least influence outcomes that you clearly cannot and hence you will seek, interpret, process and use information accordingly in an irrational manner.



Gambler’s Fallacy – You falsely assume that an unexpected occurrence of a “run” of some events enhances the probability of occurrence of an event that has not occurred. You develop a tendency to think that future probabilities are altered by past events (when in reality it is not so) and process information accordingly.



Déformation professionnelle – you tend to process information according to the conventions of your own profession, forgetting any broader point of view. You fall victim to the Law of the Hammer – “When the only tool you have is a hammer, every problem looks like a nail” – this may happen owing to overspecialization or too straitjacketed professional training which hampers a liberal broad perspective.

To be continued…

VIKRAM KARVE

http://www.linkedin.com/in/karve

http://vikramkarve.sulekha.com

vikramkarve@sify.com

Wednesday, November 18, 2009

COGNITIVE BIAS

Cognition and Information



By



VIKRAM KARVE





Part I – Cognitive Biases





The term cognition refers to a faculty for the processing of information. It is the process of perceiving, thinking, reasoning, analyzing and remembering.



Information is the value or quality of a message or communication between a sender and a receiver. Data is observation of facts and information is a collection of data from which conclusions may be drawn, decisions taken and knowledge acquired.



Understanding Human Behaviour is sine qua non for the successful design and implementation of Soft Systems [Human Activity Systems], Management Information Systems and, indeed, all Information Processing Systems.



Human behaviour plays an important role in human information processing.



It must be remembered that Information Systems are not installed in a vacuum; they are implanted into a living body, an organisation, a Human Activity Systems.



Human beings are being continuously exposed to an enormous number of stimuli. Cognition of all the stimuli is not possible and most stimuli are eliminated by a complex cognitive process. Even those perceived may be subject to cognitive biases.



A better understanding of human information processing enhances the usefulness of information technology and systems.





COGNITIVE BIASES






Here are a few salient cognitive biases which affect information formulation, acquisition, analysis and interpretation:



Adjustment and Anchoring – In situations of information overload there is a tendency to resort to the anchoring and adjustment heuristic and to rely too heavily, or “anchor” on a past reference or on one trait or piece of information when making decisions. For example, you may emphasize too much on the first piece of information you encounter.



Selective Perception – You accept / absorb only that information that is in consonance with, or confirms, your views, beliefs and values.



Wishful Thinking – You interpret information according to what might be pleasing to imagine [as you would like things to be] rather than according to actual evidence or rational logical reality.



Self-fulfilling Prophecy – is the tendency to engage in behaviors that elicit results which will (consciously or not) confirm our beliefs. You seek, acquire and analyze only that information that confirms or lends credibility to your views and values and ignore any information that contradicts your views or values. This is a “Confirmation bias” exemplified by an irrational tendency to search for, interpret or remember information in a way that confirms your preconceptions.



Ease of Recall – Information which can easily be recalled or accessed affects your perception of the likelihood of similar events occurring again. You rely too much on information that is easy to recall from memory.



Conservation – You reach premature conclusions on the basis of too small a sample of information.



Order Effects – The order in which information is presented to you affects information retention in your memory. Typically, the first piece of information presented [primacy effect] and the last piece of information presented [recency effect] assume undue importance in your mind.



Overconfidence – The greater the amount of data the more confident you are about the accuracy of the data.



Availability – you only rely on and use easily available information and ignore significant information that may not be so easily sourced.



Bandwagon Effect – you develop a tendency to believe information because many other people believe the same information. This may be a manifestation of Groupthink and you tend to “jump on the bandwagon”.



Hindsight – you are unable to think objectively if you receive information that a certain outcome has occurred and then told to ignore this information. With hindsight, outcomes that have occurred seem to have been inevitable; sometimes this is called the “I-knew-it-all-along” effect, the inclination to see past events as being predictable. You see relationships more easily in hindsight than in foresight.



Habit – You choose some information because it was previously accepted for a perceived similar purpose [precedence syndrome] or because of superstition.



Illusion of Control – You develop a tendency for to believe you can control or at least influence outcomes that you clearly cannot and hence you will seek, interpret, process and use information accordingly in an irrational manner.



Gambler’s Fallacy – You falsely assume that an unexpected occurrence of a “run” of some events enhances the probability of occurrence of an event that has not occurred. You develop a tendency to think that future probabilities are altered by past events (when in reality it is not so) and process information accordingly.



Déformation professionnelle – you tend to process information according to the conventions of your own profession, forgetting any broader point of view. You fall victim to the Law of the Hammer – “When the only tool you have is a hammer, every problem looks like a nail” – this may happen owing to overspecialization or too straitjacketed professional training which hampers a liberal broad perspective.





[To be continued…]




VIKRAM KARVE


http://www.linkedin.com/in/karve


http://vikramkarve.sulekha.com/


vikramkarve@sify.com

Tuesday, June 2, 2009

SOFTWARE DEFINED RADIO

SOFTWARE DEFINED RADIO [SDR]

[Here is an article on SDR compiled by my students Shijesh, Sibil, Shyju and John by browsing the internet, books and journals]


The rapid growth of technology and changing trends in the Communication techniques has paved way for the introduction of many telecommunication devices, many of which are not feasible to modify cost effectively due to lack of flexibility in their implementation. Software Defined Radio (SDR) technology mitigates this problem by providing the flexibility through software.

Software-Defined Radio (SDR) is a rapidly evolving technology that is receiving enormous recognition and generating widespread interest in the telecommunication industry. Over the last few years, analog radio systems are being replaced by digital radio systems and programmable hardware modules are increasingly being used in digital radio systems at different functional levels. SDR technology aims to take advantage of these programmable hardware modules to build open-architecture based radio system software.

An SDR system is a radio communication system where components that have typically been implemented in hardware are instead implemented using software on embedded computing devices. In other words SDR is a Radio in which some or all of the physical layer functions are software defined.

A Radio is any kind of device that wirelessly transmits or receives signals in the radio frequency (RF) part of the electromagnetic spectrum to facilitate the transfer of information.

In today's world, radios exist in a multitude of items such as cell phones, computers, car door openers, vehicles, and televisions.

While the concept of SDR is not new, the rapidly evolving capabilities of digital electronics are practical enabling many processes that were once only theoretically possible.

In the past, radio systems were designed to communicate using one or two waveforms [waveform here refers to any specific standard like Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM), Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA), and Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) or it can be as simple as Frequency or Amplitude Modulation (FM or AM)].

As a result, two groups of people with different types of traditional radio were not able to communicate due to incompatibility problems. The need to communicate with people using different types of equipment can only be solved using software programmable radios because of its flexible architecture.

Traditional hardware based radio devices limit cross-functionality and can only be modified through physical intervention. This results in higher production costs and minimal flexibility in supporting multiple waveform standards. By contrast, software defined radio technology provides an efficient and comparatively inexpensive solution to this problem, allowing multi-mode, multi-band and/or multi-functional wireless devices that can be enhanced using software upgrades.


The primary goal of SDR is to replace as many analog components and hardwired digital VLSI devices of the transceiver (radio) as possible with programmable devices.

Some of the advantages of SDR are:

Multifunctionality. The same piece of hardware i.e. the radio set can be used to transmit, receive and process different communication signals that adhere to different air interface standards. This can be done simply by reconfiguring the software.

Global Mobility. The same piece of hardware i.e. the radio set can be used in different parts of the world that endorse different air interface standards. This can again be done simply by reconfiguring the software.

Compactness and power efficient design. Unlike traditional non-SDR systems, which require multiple hardware sets for multi-functional communication, the same piece of SDR hardware can be reduced for such a purpose. This results in compact and power –efficient design, especially as the number of systems increases.

Ease of manufacture. A SDR comprises of fewer hardware parts than a traditional radio since most processing is done in software within a general-purpose microprocessors or special purpose microprocessors like the DSP, or in reconfigurable hardware including FPGAs. This eases the production cycle for the manufacturer with lesser parts to standardize and produce.

Ease of upgrades. Any service upgrade can be easily introduced through the release of new software versions without the expense of recalling or replacing the hardware units. A user can simply download the software off the internet and load it into the SDR.
The most significant asset of SDR is versatility. Wireless systems employ protocols that vary from one service to another. Even in the same type of service, for example wireless fax, the protocol often differs from country to country. A single SDR set with an all-inclusive software repertoire can be used in any mode, anywhere in the world. Changing the service type, the mode, and/or the modulation protocol involves simply selecting and launching the requisite program, and making sure the batteries are adequately charged if portable operation is contemplated.

The ultimate goal of SDR engineers is to provide a single radio transceiver capable of playing the roles of GSM phone, CDMA phone, Wimax terminal, wireless fax, wireless Web browser, Global Positioning System (GPS) unit, and other functions still in the realm of science fiction.


VIKRAM KARVE

http://vikramkarve.sulekha.com/

http://www.linkedin.com/in/karve

vikramkarve@sify.com



Saturday, April 11, 2009

SHOR Information Processing Model

The SHOR Paradigm

By

VIKRAM KARVE



“The man who insists upon seeing with perfect clearness before he decides, never decides” …Frederic Amiel



Decision-making is so pervasive that everyone, professionally or personally, is involved with making a variety of decisions.

In today’s fast-moving world, the timing of a decision is of paramount importance in many decision-making situations. In real life even the “perfect” decision may not be optimal if it is made too late.

Information is a vital resource in decision-making. One of the most important characteristics of successful managers is the ability to make the correct decision when confronted with imperfect or insufficient information (i.e.) Decision-making under conditions of uncertainty.

In the context of decision-processing, two realms or domains of uncertainty are:

1. Information Input Uncertainty which creates the need for hypothesis generation and evaluation;

2. Consequence-of-Action Uncertainty which creates the need for option generation and evaluation.


THE SHOR PARADIGM


A decision taxonomy: The Stimulus – Hypothesis – Options – Response (SHOR) Paradigm, formulated by Wohl, is useful in such decision situations. The SHOR paradigm represents a qualitative, descriptive, model as distinct from a quantitative, predictive model, and comprises three primary decision-making task elements:

S: Stimulus Input Data Processing
H: Hypothesis Generation, Hypothesis Evaluation, Information Processing [What is?]
O: Option Generation, Option Evaluation, Decision-Making [What if?]
R: Response Output Action

The SHOR paradigm is basically an extension of the classical Stimulus – Response (SR) Paradigm of behaviourist psychology.

The SHOR paradigm provides explicitly for the necessity to deal with information input uncertainty and consequence-of-action uncertainty, and helps us understand some of the peculiar human factors that affect the quality of the decision-making and answering questions such as:

What makes some decision-makers perform better than others, especially in placing high-value assets at risk, in business?

What are the sources and dimensions of “poor” performance?


HUMAN ERRORS IN DECISION-MAKING


Based on the SHOR Model, human errors in decision-making appear to lie in four domains:

(S) Stimulus: “I didn’t know…”
(H) Hypothesis: “I didn’t understand…”
(O) Options: “I didn’t consider…”
(R) Response: “I didn’t act…”

Stimulus based errors of the type “I didn’t know…” result from lack or inadequacy of information, the true inability to obtain information.

“I didn’t understand…” is the fundamental result of information input uncertainty, while “I didn’t consider…” is the product of consequence-of-action uncertainty.

It is possible to have accessed all significant information, to have developed the correct hypothesis and to have selected the best option and yet fail to take appropriate action. The two possible reasons for the “I didn’t act…” type of response error are:

1. Paralysis: This is a complete failure to act, the pathological ‘observation of an inevitable course’ without intervention. It is caused by an over-riding emotional struggle in which some internal factor is being placed in conflict with the course of action selected by the decision-maker. The final scene in the evergreen classic film The Bridge on the River Kwai (1957) exemplifies such a situation.

2. Misjudgement: The decision-maker correctly decides what to do but errs in either or both of the two dimensions – how [the specifics of the action] or when [the timing of the action].

Prediction of the critical consequences of inaction may be of some help in dealing with paralysis whilst the ability to perform sensitivity analyses may assist in alleviating misjudgement.

Any Decision-Maker [and designers of decision aids] must address the four cardinal types of errors epitomized by the SHOR paradigm: “I didn’t know…”, “I didn’t understand…”, “I didn’t consider…” and “I didn’t act…”



DECISION-MAKING IN UNCERTAINTY


In the context of decision-making in uncertainty, the conflict theory paradigm developed by Janis and Mann may be apt. This paradigm postulates five patterns of coping behaviour which tends to occur in such situations:

1. Unconflicted Adherence in which the uncertain, or risk, information is ignored and the decision-maker complacently decides to continue whatever he has been doing.

2. Unconflicted Change to a new course of action, where the decision-maker uncritically adopts whichever new course of action is most salient, obvious or strongly recommended.

3. Defensive Avoidance in which the decision-maker evades conflict by procrastinating, shifting responsibility to someone else, or constructing wishful rationalisations and remaining selectively inattentive to corrective information.

4. Hypervigilance wherein the decision-maker searches frantically for a way out of the dilemma and impulsively seizes upon a hastily contrived solution that seems to promise immediate relief, overlooking the full range of consequences of his choice because of emotional excitement, repetitive thinking and cognitive constriction. In its most extreme form hypervigilance is referred to as “panic”.

5. Concerned Vigilance in which the decision-maker optimally processes pertinent information, generates and evaluates hypotheses and options before selecting a response as characterised by the SHOR paradigm.


In many real-life situations a decision-maker cannot always keep waiting until the entire information-input and consequence-of-action conditions are known a priori with certainty. In most cases there is no such thing as “perfect” certainty.

If a single most important characteristic is crucial to a decision-maker in any field, it is the ability to make optimal decisions in conditions of uncertainty. Qualitative descriptive models like the SHOR paradigm may prove useful in such situations.

To quote Frederic Amiel once again: “The man who insists upon seeing with perfect clearness before he decides, never decides”.


VIKRAM KARVE

Copyright © Vikram Karve 2009
Vikram Karve has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 to be identified as the author of this work.


vikramkarve@sify.com

vikramkarve@hotmail.com

http://www.linkedin.com/in/karve

http://vikramkarve.sulekha.com/

http://www.ryze.com/go/karve